We constructed a new index of global uncertainty using the first principal component of the stock market volatility for the largest 15 economies. We evaluate the impact of global uncertainty on the global economy using the new global database from Global Economic Indicators (DGEI), Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Global uncertainty shocks are less frequent than those observed in data on the U.S. economy. Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global inflation, global growth and in the global interest rate (based on official/policy interest rates set by central banks). Our decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows that global financial uncertainty shocks are more important than non-financial shocks. Over the period 1981 to 2014 global financial uncertainty forecasts 18.26% and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and global inflation respectively. The non-financial uncertainty shocks have insignificant effects on global growth. The model for global variables shows more protracted and substantial negative effects of uncertainty on growth and inflation than does a panel model estimating associations of local country-level variables. This outcome is reversed for the effect of uncertainty on official interest rate.
Global Uncertainty and the Global Economy: Decomposing the Impact of Uncertainty Shocks

Introduction
The impact of uncertainty on economic activity has generally been studied at country level.
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The rapid and accelerating process of financial globalization and new technologies prompt the question as to whether or not economic uncertainty is best addressed as a global phenomenon rather than a country-specific occurrence. In this investigation, we aim to answer the following questions: How to measure global uncertainty? How does global uncertainty affect the global economy? Do global uncertainty shocks have different effects than U.S. uncertainty shocks on the global Economy? Does the source of uncertainty shocks matter for the global economy?
To answer these questions we developed a new index of global uncertainty using the first principal component of the stock market volatility of the largest 15 economies. 2 We also evaluated the impact of global uncertainty on global interest rate, inflation and industrial production using the new global Database from Global Economic Indicators (DGEI), Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Most measures of country-specific uncertainty in the literature are related to the firm volatility on returns and/or profitability, assuming that high uncertainty causes firms to temporarily reduce investment and hiring, and consumers to delay important purchases. In a major paper, Bloom (2009) emphasizes the negative impact of uncertainty on employment and output for the U.S. after World War II. In his work, Bloom develops an uncertainty index based on firm stock return and/or firm profit growth.
Alternative measures of uncertainty, based on spreads between low-rated and highly rated corporate bonds, are discussed by a number of authors, including contributions by 1 See for example Bloom (2009) , Gilchrist et al. (2010) , Bachmann and Bayer (2011) , Knotek and Khan (2011), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011) , Bekaert et al. (2013) , Bachmann et al. (2013) , and Jurado et al. (2015) . 2 Note that Bloom et al. (2007) show that share-return volatility is significantly correlated with alternative measures of uncertainty proxies. Favero (2009) , Arellano et al. (2010) and Sim et al. (2010) . Bredin and Fountas (2009) utilize a general bivariate GARCH-M model to generate the macroeconomic uncertainty associated with output growth and inflation in EU countries. Ferrara and Marsilli (2014) provide a timely indicator of the world GDP growth based on the Factor-Augmented Mixed Data Sampling (FAMIDAS) model. More recently, Jurado et al. (2015) argue that stock market volatility may not be closely linked to "true" economic uncertainty, and propose new time series measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. These time series based indicators are built with U.S macroeconomic data and are identified as the unforecastable component of the macroeconomic series. Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) develop a more general approach to describe macroeconomic uncertainty. Their macroeconomic index is based on assessing the likelihood of the realized forecast error of macroeconomic variables. The more the difficulty of the realization of the forecast, the greater the uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment. Charemza et al. (2015) suggest a new measure of inflation forecast uncertainty that accounts for possible inter-country dependence.
Our measure of global uncertainty captures important political, war, financial and economic events over the period 1981 to 2014. Global uncertainty shocks are less frequent than those observed in data on the U.S economy. Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a sharp decline in global interest rate, global inflation and global industrial production.
The maximum decline of global inflation and industrial production occurs six months after a global uncertainty shock, while the maximum decline in global interest rate occurs 16 months after a global uncertainty shock. Results are robust to both Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive Model (FAVAR) and Factor Augmented Bayesian Vector Autoregressive Model (FABVAR) estimations.
Our decomposition of global uncertainty shocks shows that global financial uncertainty shocks are more important than non-financial shocks. Over 1981 to 2014 global financial uncertainty forecasts 18.26% and 14.95% of the variation in global growth and global inflation respectively. The non-financial uncertainty shocks, in contrast, forecast statistically insignificant 7.75% and 2.15% of the variation in global growth and global inflation, respectively. During the global financial crisis, shocks to global uncertainty and to the global interest rate combine to reduce global growth. This paper proceeds as follows. A new index of global uncertainty is introduced in Section 2. The effect of global uncertainty on the global economy is modelled in Section 3. In Section 4 preliminary results are examined with FAVAR. Section 5 compares the differences between the U.S. and global uncertainty shocks. In section 6, global uncertainty is decomposed in financial and non-financial shocks. Section 7 concludes.
A new index of global uncertainty
Methodology
The empirical literature on economic uncertainty has generally focused on the volatility of stock market returns and/or firm profitability as providing a measure of uncertain environments within which decisions are made.
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Increased uncertainty can decrease the willingness to hire, invest and consume, with effects on firm profitability and therefore economic growth. In this investigation we build a global uncertainty index by extracting the first principal component of largest 15 economies stock market volatility. 4 Let , be the difference of the natural log of the stock market index of country :
where denotes the average monthly stock price for a given country at time , with
3 An important thread in the literature is that uncertainty faced by the individual firm is embodied in its own stock price volatility (Leahy and Whited (1996) , Bloom (2009 ), Bloom et al. (2007 and Baum et al. (2010) 
is calculated such that it accounts for the greatest possible variance in the data set. The weights are the elements of an eigenvector with unit length and standardised by the restriction: ⋯ 1.
Global and the U.S. uncertainty indices.
In Figures 1 and 2 , we show the global uncertainty index developed in Equation (1) to (3) and the U.S. uncertainty index. Note that we attempt to estimate this index for G20 economies. However, data for Indonesia, Iran, Thailand Nigeria and Poland were not available for the full sample period. A structural VAR model of order is utilized:
where
) is a 4 1 vector of endogenous variables, denotes the 4 4 contemporaneous coefficient matrix, represents a 4x1 vector of constant terms, refers to the 4 4 autoregressive coefficient matrices, and stands for a 4 1 vector of structural disturbances.
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To construct the structural VAR model representation, the reduced-form VAR model is consistently estimated using the least-squares method and is obtained by multiplying both sides of Equation (4) by . The reduced-form error term is and ~ 0, Σ .
The identifying restrictions on , is a lower-triangle coefficient matrix in the structural VAR model. This set up follows Christiano et al. (2005) , Bekaert et al. (2014) , and Jurado et al. (2015) in placing the output variable first, followed by global CPI, Global We follow Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015) in setting p=12 which allows for a potentially long-delay in effects of uncertainty shocks on the economy and for a sufficient number of lags to remove serial correlation. interest rate and global uncertainty. 8 The ordering of the variables assumes that the macroeconomic aggregates of output and CPI do not respond contemporaneously to shocks to the monetary policy of interest rate. The information of the monetary authority within a month consists of current and lagged values of the macroeconomic aggregates and past values of the uncertainty. The uncertainty variable ordered last captures the fact that the uncertainty is a stock market based variable and responds instantly to monetary policy shocks. The structural shocks to the dynamic responses of an endogenous variable are then identified using a Cholesky decomposition. In Appendix B-C, for robustness analysis, we run both the FAVAR and FABVAR models using the reverse ordering of these variables that is proposed by Bloom (2009) .
Data and global macroeconomic variables
The data for both the global uncertainty index and the VAR models are monthly from January 1981 to December 2014. Before 1981, data are not available on the stock markets from many developing countries. , and are factors estimated using data on emerging economies, advanced economies (excluding the U.S.), and the U.S. The data on interest rate, CPI and IP 8 Note we omitted the variables stock prices, wages, working hours and employment as these variables are not available at global level.
are taken from Global Economic Indicators (DGEI), Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas for the G40 countries. In DGEI weights (based on shares of world GDP (PPP)) are applied to the official/policy interest rates (determined by central banks) in levels and are applied to the indexes for industrial production and headline price indexes in growth rates to construct indices for emerging economies and advanced economies (excluding the U.S). In 2014 on a GDP PPP basis the G40 economies account for 83% of global GDP, and within the G40, the U.S., 19 advanced economies (excluding the U.S.), and 20 emerging economies account for 18%, 25%, and 40%, respectively, of global GDP. Combined, the 20 largest emerging economies on a PPP basis are now almost as big as the 20 largest developed economies.
,
, and are the leading principal components given by:
, , ,
where the superscripts US, Ad and Em represent the United States, advanced economies (excluding the U.S) and emerging economies.
The FAVAR model results
The reduced-form VAR model of Equation (4) is consistently estimated by the ordinary least square method. We utilize the resulting estimates to construct the structural VAR representation of the model. The dynamic effect is examined by the impulse responses of global output growth, global inflation and interest rate to the structural global uncertainty
shock. We present the responses to one-time global uncertainty shocks as well as to the historical episodes of the uncertainty shocks.
The effects of global uncertainty shocks on the economy
Figures 4 shows the impact of one standard deviation global uncertainty shocks on global industrial production growth, global CPI inflation and global interest rate, for the FAVAR estimation. The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. We utilize the impulse response functions in Figure 4 to assess the timing and magnitude of the responses to onetime global uncertainty shock in the economy.
On the left hand side of Figure 4 , the lags in the VAR system estimated are indicated.
The FAVAR model is estimated with 3, 6 and 12 lags. The second, third and fourth columns in Figure 4 show responses of global interest rate, global CPI inflation and global industrial production growth to global uncertainty shocks. The results are summarized as follows:
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global industrial production growth, which is greatest after 4 to 8 months depending on the specification.
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a quick and sharp decline in global CPI reaching the greatest point of decline after 6 months. However, when 12 lags are used in the VAR system, greatest point of decline occurs after 10 months.
 Global uncertainty shocks are associated with a decline in global interest rate; when 3 and 6 lags are used in the VAR systems the greatest decline in the global interest rate is observed after 16 months. 
Global uncertainty and local uncertainty proxy for each country
We investigate the question of whether a VAR with the local uncertainty proxy for each country does better or worse than using the global measure for all of them. This investigation will shed light on whether the global measure tracks the US because there is a global measure, or because world stock-markets all tracked the US.
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Note that when the models are specified with 12 lags, the greatest response occurs after 6 months, with a quick return to positive values after 12 months. This pattern is only observed for FAVAR model and for the FABVAR model Wishart type of priors in models with a 12 month lag. Even with a 12 month lag structure, the FABVAR model with Minnesota and Sims-Zha priors results are similar to those obtained in the FAVAR and FABVAR models with 3 month and 6 month lags.
In this estimation we used unbalanced panel data for the largest 14 economies used in our global approach. A local uncertainty proxy is constructed by the stock market volatility of each country. The other endogenous variables are growth in industrial production, CPI inflation, and official/policy interest rate for each country. In total 3936 observations are used in this estimation. Observations with inflation greater than 10% per month are excluded.
When inflation is greater than 10% per month (or an annual of inflation over 310%), uncertainty in the economy is likely to be dominated by the inflation process itself and likely to render proxy measures of uncertainty (that exclude inflation) redundant. In the data, Russia and Brazil have periods of substantial high inflation. Experimentation with restrictions on the sample with other monthly inflation cut-offs (including 5%) does not affect results.
In Figure A1 we show the impact of one standard deviation local uncertainty shocks on local industrial production growth, local CPI inflation and local interest rate, for the panel The second column in Figure A1 show responses of local industrial production growth to positive local uncertainty shocks. Following a local uncertainty shock, local industrial production growth falls sharply for the first two months, recovers abruptly in the third month, then undergoes small damped oscillations in the following months, before stabilizing after about 12 months. The time-period over which there is a negative effect of the local shock on local growth is much attenuated compared to the time-period over which there is a negative effect of the global uncertainty shock on global industrial production growth, which was over one year duration. The absolute value of the negative effect of the local shock on local growth is also much smaller than the absolute value of the negative effect of the global uncertainty shock global industrial production growth.
In the third column in Figure A1 , in response to a local uncertainty shock, local inflation falls sharply for about six months before recovering. The model for global variables also shows a more protracted and substantial negative effect of uncertainty on inflation than does the panel model estimating associations of local variables.
In the fourth column in Figure A1 the effect of local uncertainty shocks on local/official interest rates is reported. A local uncertainty shock is associated with a sharp decline in local interest rate in the first month that is reversed over the next few months, before resulting in a statistically significant decline in the interest rate after about six months which extends throughout the remainder of the 48-month horizon. In contrast to the results for growth and inflation, the model for local variables shows more protracted and substantial negative effects of uncertainty on the official interest rate than does the model estimating associations of global variables.
Historical decomposition of global uncertainty shocks
In this subsection we construct a historical decomposition of the dynamics effect of structural global uncertainty shocks on the global macroeconomic variables. It helps us to assess the timing and magnitude of the responses to a vector sequence of the uncertainty shocks that often involves different signs at each point of time. We expect that the global uncertainty shocks have very different effects on the economy at different points in time.
The cumulative contributions of structural global uncertainty shocks from estimating the structural FAVAR model in equation (4) Figure 5 , roughly during these periods. We examine these three episodes in detail.
In Figure 5 
where represents the U.S uncertainty shock derived from the volatility of the U.S. stock market. Note that coefficient is set to be zero, implies that we do not have preference in terms of ordering both U.S and global uncertainty first in the Cholesky decomposition.
11 Figure 6 shows the responses of global IP, CPI and interest rate to global uncertainty shocks (first row) and U.S uncertainty shocks (second row). In the first column a onestandard deviation shock to global uncertainty decreases global industrial production by -0.13 and a one-standard deviation shock to U.S. uncertainty reduces Global IP by less than -0.6. The global uncertainty shock is statistically significant over a more extended period of time. The global and U.S uncertainty shocks are statistically significant over 1 to 16 month and 1 to 10 month horizons, respectively. The impact of global and U.S uncertainty shocks also differ in effects on Global CPI. While the response of global CPI to global uncertainty shocks is statistically significant and reaches a minimum of -0.08, the impact of U.S.
uncertainty shocks on global CPI is much smaller and is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Finally, the global interest rate is negatively affected by a positive global uncertainty shock but the effect is only marginally statistically significant. The response of global interest rate to U.S uncertainty shocks is much smaller and is not statistically significant.
Does the source of uncertainty shocks matter for the global economy?
The central result in Section 4.2 is that the global uncertainty shocks have very different effects on the economy at different points in time. In this section we show that global uncertainty shocks have different sources. We analyse the impact of global uncertainty shocks by source on the global economy. In particular, we decompose global uncertainty shocks into global financial and non-financial shocks, where all the shock considered are those shocks which exceed 1.65 standard deviations in terms of monthly observations.
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We also estimate the Cholesky contemporaneous restriction matrix allowing to be estimated and order both U.S and Global uncertainty first and be estimated in separate models. Results are almost identical to those presented in Figure 6. 
Financial vs. non-financial uncertainty shock
In this subsection, we distinguish between financial and non-financial shocks and estimate the impact effects of both shocks on the global economy. Shocks originating in economic or financial disruption may have been amenable to better economic policy design whereas those due to war or terrorism are not (although political policies might have an impact). Examination of uncertainty shocks with an economic/financial source might lead to a better understanding of how economic policy might be designed to both avoid and mitigate the effects of future shocks.
Our definition of global financial shocks comprises the following events which exceeded 1.65 standard deviations: Black Monday, Russian Default, WorldCom, and the GFC. The global financial crisis includes the four main events described in Table D1 To disaggregate global uncertainty shocks we modify the system of equations presented in equation by subtitling the unique variable into two different uncertainty shocks: * and * , where the first variable the global financial uncertainty shock is constructed by interacting the index with a dummy variable , which takes the value of 1 when a financial shock occurs and 0 otherwise (details of the period dummies can be found in Appendix D, Table D1 ).
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The second variable (the non-financial uncertainty shocks) is constructed by interacting the index with a dummy variable , which
Note that the dummy variables only take the value of 1 when the identified shock exceeds 1.65 standard deviations following Bloom (2009). takes the value of 1 when a non-financial shock occurs and 0 otherwise. 
We set to be zero, since there is no good reason to impose an order on financial and non-financial uncertainty. Figure 7 compare the impacts of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks on key global macroeconomic variables. In the first and second rows we show the impact of financial and non-financial uncertainty shocks (respectively) on global industrial production (first column), CPI (second column) and interest rate (third column).
Results in the first column suggest that financial uncertainty shocks have a much larger impact in absolute value than the non-financial shocks in reducing global industrial production (up to -0.17 and -0.10, respectively). It is also observed that the impact of financial shocks on global industrial production is faster. The greatest impact of financial shocks on global industrial production is observed between 6 to 10 months later, compared to 11 to 16 months later for non-financial shocks. More remarkable are the differences between the responses of Global CPI to those shocks. Financial uncertainty shocks have a negative effect on global CPI that is statistically significant at conventional levels. By contrast, nonfinancial shocks do not have a statistically significant effect on Global CPI. In the third
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Note that we slightly innovate with respect of Bloom (2009) , who uses only a single dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the uncertainty shock occurs and 0 otherwise. The reason for doing that is because Bloom (2009)'s definition does not capture the magnitude of the shock. By interacting the and a dummy variable the shocks now also capture the dimension of the shock. column of Figure 7 , it is observed that central banks eventually reduce interest rates by similar amounts after both financial and non-financial shocks. Table 1 
Variance decomposition of global macroeconomic variables to financial and nonfinancial uncertainty shocks
Conclusions
We constructed a new index of global uncertainty using the first principal component Notes: The dashed lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980) , where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient.
Appendix A: The panel data approach
In this estimation we used unbalanced panel data the largest 14 economies (same countries used in our global approach). In total 3936 observations are used in this estimation.
Observations of periods of very high inflation (higher than 10% per month) are excluded. We utilize a Minnesota prior that involves setting the elements of to be zero to ensure shrinkage of the VAR coefficients toward zero and reduce the over-fitting risk. It assumes the prior covariance matrix V to be diagonal, in the sense that own lags of endogenous variables are more likely to be important predictors than lags of other variables.
The error variance-covariance matrix is the standard OLS estimate of the error terms Σ / .
Alternatively, we estimate the FABVAR model using two different non-informative priors, in that the Minnesota prior ignores any uncertainty in the elements of error variancecovariance matrix . The first is the natural conjugate prior that treats as an unknown parameter, ∼ , , where is the prior hyper-parameters. Here we choose small degree of freedom parameters, 1 1 and 0.01 1 , in order to put a small weight on the priors that makes the priors to contain small amount of information relative to the sample. The second is the Sims-Zha normal-Wishart prior for using the fictitious observations (Sim and Zha (2008) 
